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I. METHODOLOGY
Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings' unique new treatment of
United Kingdom administrative law, Law and Administration,' should
be measured against the monolithic nature of legal scholarship. Ameri-
can law book scholarship appears etched in stone; the casebook remains
the prime ingredient of American legal education. Typical casebook au-
thors select their cases to produce a variety of skills, including case syn-
thesis, inductive reasoning, analytical thinking-the tools of the
problem-solving lawyer. 2 The textbook, the other pillar of legal educa-
tion writing, weaves together myriad authority to produce a coherent set
of norms to aid both students and lawyers. 3 For over a century, the
casebook and textbook have been two main foci of serious legal writing
designed to cover comprehensively particular fields of law.
The production of these archetype forms of scholarship continues
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1. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLNGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION (1984).
2. See, eg., C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN, & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS,
xxi-xxii (3d ed. 1977); D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE (5th ed. 1983). For a discussion of the educational virtues of the case method and
casebook, see Dente, A Century of Case Method: An Apologia, 50 WASH. L. REv. 93, 95-98 (1974);
Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379, 380-81 (1952); Patterson, The Case Method in
American Legal Education: Its Origins and Objectives 4 . LEGAL EDuc. 1, 20-21 (1951).
3. See eg., B. BrrrKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATON OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS (4th ed. 1979); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMRALTY (2d ed. 1975);
R. LEFLAR, AMERiCAN CONFIwCTS LAW (3d ed. 1977).
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unabated with surprisingly minor variation in form or style.4 To be sure,
many serious scholars are writing normative books that critique specific
legal problems.5 Recent emphasis on policy may mark the decline of the
traditional research outputs, the casebook and treatise, and illustrates the
resurgence of normative legal philosophy.6 Yet these policy works rarely
serve the goal of broad coverage of an entire subject of law and, while
necessary and valuable, do not compete with the textbook and casebook
for those seeking systematic knowledge of a given field of law.
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler's Federal Courts and the Federal
System 7 broke casebook methodology ground by focusing more attention
on the note materials than case selection. Its series of probing notes and
challenging questions set a standard for subsequent casebook authors and
troubled generations of law students seeking the elusive "right" answer.
The style of this highly influential" casebook bridged the gap between the
casebook and the textbook.9 Yet little has occurred since its writing to
combine the best of the vastly different appeals of the casebook and text-
book style.
4. Accordingly, the various book publishers divide their lists of publications into "casebook"
or "text" subheadings. See, eg, Foundation Press, University Casebook Series (Summer-Fall 1984);
Little, Brown and Co., Law Books (May 1984).
5. See, eg., B. AcKERmAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); J. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONo
(1978).
6. See Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy (Book Review),
97 HARv. L. REv. 1223, 1225-36 (1984); Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149,
1150 (1981) (prestige of writing a treatise "has tarnished"); Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal
Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. Rv. 632, 633 (1981)
(writing of positivistic treatise in decline).
7. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953).
8. Numerous commentators on the Hart and Wechsler casebook emphasized its utility beyond
the classroom. See eg., Kurland, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REv. 906, 906-07 (1954) (materials
"so much more than a casebook ... that they command recommendation to a wider audience than
the students and faculty who might meet the book in the classroom"); McGowan, Book Review, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 1015, 1015 (1974) (first edition "a unique assemblage of legal materials");
Monaghan, Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889, 898 (1974) (book "deservedly achieved a reputa-
tion that is extraordinary among case-books and, indeed, rare even among learned treatises");
Monaghan, Book Review, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1753, 1753 (1970) (Hart and Wechsler book "prodded
students and [teachers] to think over their heads about the deepest problems of the legal process")
(quoting address by Kingman Brewster, Jr., President of Yale University awarding honorary degree
to Professor Hart (June 9, 1969)). For Supreme Court citations to Hart and Wechsler, FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980);
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 581 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
442 U.S. 653, 672 n.19 (1979); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 386 (1977) (Burger, C. J., concurring
in part); Oregon ex rel State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 392
(1977)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
9. Kurland termed the note questions "the definitive text on the subject of federal jurisdiction
in spite of its casebook label" and considered the book's questions textual "in the sense that Plato's
socratic dialogues constitute a text." Kurland, supra note 8, at 907.
LAW AND ADMINISTRA TION
With the publication of the pathbreaking Law and Administration,
legal education now possesses a third type of book. Law and Administra-
tion is neither casebook nor textbook; it combines cases, doctrinal text,
and normative policy in a novel fashion that no American law book has
accomplished. The book weaves together case excerpts, rules, and ad-
ministrative agency sociology to create a dynamic understanding of ad-
ministrative law as an evolving process. Although Law and
Administration principally covers the administrative law of the United
Kingdom, its numerous comparisons to the law and policy of other na-
tions rely heavily upon American administrative law and jurisprudence
scholars. Harlow and Rawlings fashion materials of interest to adminis-
trative lawyers everywhere. Most chapters begin with non-case discus-
sions of subtopics of administrative law, then switch to heavily but
cogently edited excerpts of case opinions. The cases illustrate the au-
thors' textual treatment and often refute or support the large number of
scholarly theories discussed by Harlow and Rawlings. While neither
cases nor text predominate, the book's force remains primarily textual.
The authors are British law faculty at the London School of Economics,
and in the United Kingdom the rule-oriented text and lecture remain the
prime educational ingredients.10 Nonetheless, the presence of numerous
case examples throughout Law and Administration makes the book a
rare combination of clarity and vision, qualities extremely difficult to
achieve in a field as diverse as administrative law.
A few illustrations clarify this methodology. In the opening chap-
ters of Law and Administration, Harlow and Rawlings examine various
comprehensive theories of administrative law. In Chapter One, "Red
Light Theories," the authors present and assess the popular theory that
administrative law aims at curbing or controlling the state through judi-
cial review of agency abuse." Professor Wade exemplifies the Red Light
position: "The primary purpose of administrative law. . . is to keep the
powers of government within their legal bounds, so as to protect the citi-
zen against their abuse. The powerful engines of authority must be pre-
vented from running amuck."12 According to the Red Light theorists,' 3
10. See, eg., Dworkin, Legal Research, 102 DAEDALUS, Spring, 1973 at 53-54 (contrasting the
practical approach to legal research of the American lawyer to the more insulated, academic ap-
proach of his British counterpart); Folsom & Roberts, The Warick Story: Being Led Down the Con-
textual Path of the Law, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 166, 166 (1979) (the British emphasize doctrinal
curricula, rule memorization, and the abstract teaching of law from treatises); Twining, Is your
Textbook Really Necessary?, 11 J. Soc. PUB. TCHRS. L. 81, 81 (1970) (expressing concern over the
dominating position occupied by legal textbooks); Wilson & March, A Second Survey of Legal Edu-
cation in the United Kingdom, 13 J. Soc. PUB. TCHRS. L. 241, 284-85 (1975) (British law student
taught by formal lectures, tutorial, and written work).
11. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 12-34.
12. H. WADE, ADMINiSTRATivE LAW 5 (Ist ed. 1961).
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the courts are the primary source of administrative law. Harlow and
Rawlings first explain the theory and dissect it with critical comments of
their own and a broad range of other writers, ranging from Dicey to
Laski. 14 The chapter then switches focus by offering discussion and quo-
tation from four carefully selected cases that help the reader measure the
validity of the Red Light theory and its critics. The authors' case selec-
tion incorporates various landmarks in British judicial review of agency
abuse, including Ridge v. Baldwin' 5 and R. v. Commission for Racial
Equality.16 As is true with American casebooks, the selection of cases
serves multiple goals. In addition to permitting analytical comparison to
the Red Light theory, these cases force the reader to probe triggering
mechanisms for judicial activism such as the troubled "administrative/
judicial" distinction.
The contrasting second chapter, "Green Light Theories," illustrates
the authors' policy-oriented approach and their novel methodology. The
opening of every chapter contains extremely beneficial transition discus-
sions that dissect prior chapters in order to highlight the precise purpose
of the new chapter. For example, at the start of Chapter Two, the au-
thors note that the Red Light theories of Chapter One view "English
administrative law as an instrument for the control of power and for the
protection of individual liberty, the emphasis being on the courts rather
than on government and the state often being regarded in light of an
intruder."1 7 In contrast, "Green light theory finds the 'model of govern-
ment' more congenial," 1 8 views "the function of courts in checking exec-
utive action .. .a questionable activity"19 and considers the role of
administrative law "not to act as counterweight to the interventionist
state but to facilitate government action." 20 According to the Green
Light theory, law aids rather than checks agency behavior by helping the
agency be procedurally efficient in achieving its substantive goals. Green
Light scholars engage in "functionalist studies," such as "interpreting
concepts like 'discretion.' "21 Some Green Lighters consider courts as
13. Harlow and Rawlings include as Red Light theorists H. Wade, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(5th ed. 1982), S. deSmith, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATVE AcnoN (Ist ed. 1959), and A.
Dicey. C. HARLow & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 5-19. For an excellent review of the most
recent editions of the Wade and deSmith books, placing each in the Red Light camp, see Galligan,
Judicial Review and the Textbook Writers, 2 Ox. J. LEG. STUD. 257 (1982).
14. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 1-25.
15. [1964] AC 40.
16. [1980] 1 WLR 1580.
17. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 35 (emphasis in original).
18. Id. at 35.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 39.
21. Id at 41.
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"obstacles to progress" and try to "minimize" judicial influence.22
Rather than the "firefighting" judicial role provided by Red Light the-
ory, Green Lighters look attentively to the "firewatching" functions 23 of
various legal institutions, including courts. The writers Harlow and
Rawlings associate with the Green Light theory are William Robson,24
Felix Cohen,25 the French writer Duguit,26 and J.A.G. Griffith.27
Firewatching is deemed "more efficient" than firefighting.28
Harlow and Rawlings themselves appear to prefer the Green Light
position. The tone of the entire book forces this conclusion. They are
particularly skeptical of judicial review rules in the excellent chapter en-
titled "Discretionary Justice?" 29 From the chapter's beginning quotation
of Gellhorn and Robinson-"our suspicion [is] that the rules of overrul-
ing judicial review have no more substance at the core than a seedless
grape" 3 0-to its selection of cases clearly illustrating judicial discretion,31
Harlow and Rawlings exhibit by example what they later expressly con-
fess: "There is considerable agreement today among public lawyers that
judicial review of discretionary power is itself discretionary in character.
The leading authorities cannot sustain the case that judicial review is
22. Id.
23. See id. at 44 (administrators prefer fire watching to fire fighting because it is more bureau-
cratically efficient).
24. See id at 35-36 (quoting W. ROBSON, JuSTIcE AND ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 421 (3d ed.
1951)); see also W. ROBSON, THE GovERNoRs AND THE GOVERNED (1964); W. ROBSON, JUSTICE
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Ist ed. 1928); Robson, Justice and Administrative Law Reconsidered,
32 CURRENT LEGAL PROS. 107 (1979).
25. See C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 36 (quoting Cohen, The Problems of a
Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REv. 5 (1937)).
26. See C. HALOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 37-39 (citing L. DUGurr, LAW IN THE
MODERN STATE (H. Laski trans. 1921)).
27. See C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 41-47; see also Griffith, The Political
Constitution, 42 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1979); Griffith, The Crichel Down Affair, 18 MOD. L. REv. 557
(1955); J. Gais'rrH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATVE LAW (Ist ed. 1952).
28. C. HARLOW & K_ RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 44. See Jennings, Courts and Administrative
Law-The Experience of English Housing Legislation, 49 HARV. L. REv. 426,430 (1936). Given the
Green Light attention to the role of government, Harlow and Rawlings provide excerpts from and
discussion of various scholars who have contributed vision to the purpose of the state, including
Jennings, C. HARLOW & K. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 40 (citing W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND
THE CONSTITTION (1938)); Reich, id., at 48-49 (citing C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA
(1970); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J 733 (1964)); and Schonfeld, id., at 50-51 (citing A.
SCHONFELD, MODERN CAprrALIsM (1965)).
29. C. HARLOW & L RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 311-47.
30. Gellhora & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 771, 780
(1975).
31. Eg., Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A.C. 578; Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v.
Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223; Bromley LBC v. Greater London Council [1982] WLR 62;
Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, [1968] 2 WLR 924; Secretary of State for
Educ. & Science v. Tameside MBC, [1976] 3 WLR 641.
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based on precise and clearly applicable rules. ' '32 This leaning toward the
Green Light-or at least a robust fear of an administrative law shaped
mainly by judicial decisions-is revealed early in the book when the au-
thors pronounce that "the trend of modem administrative law is toward
controls which are internal and prospective. '33
In contrast to the short case excerpts of the first chapter, Harlow
and Rawlings selected only one case for the Green Light chapter. None-
theless, inclusion of "the Skytrain Affair" 34 works very well and permits
the reader to test comprehensively the theory earlier set out. In choosing
a complicated "case" having legislative, judicial, bureaucratic, political,
and business aspects, the authors have depicted the multifaceted nature
of administrative law. Harlow and Rawlings offer an excerpt from Lord
Denning's holding in Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Department of Trade35 that
the Minister of Transportation's "guidance" permitting only one air li-
cense per route without the consent of British Airways constituted ultra
vires action, 36 together with critical commentary from law journal writ-
ers,37 and the actual 1971 legislation. 38 Students must ponder the stat-
ute's true meaning: it granted the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) the
task of licensing air routes, set out a procompetitive general policy to
create at least one major non-nationalized British airline, and also per-
mitted the politically appointed Minister of Trade the right to influence
the CAA by giving the agency "directions" 39 or "guidance."''4  After
Laker Airways received a CAA license to run Skytrain to the United
States, the new Labour government caused the administrative process to
change course by issuing a new "guidance" that limited to one the
number of British airlines serving the same route.41 By including the
"guidance" in the materials Harlow and Rawlings permit readers to ana-
lyze the tension between static (and ambiguous) legislation and regula-
tory shifts accompanying changes of governments. Students see a
process far more clearly with this full range of "case" materials than they
would using only text or the case itself.42
32. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 342.
33. Id at 45.
34. Id at 52-59.
35. [1977] Q.B. 643 (C. A.) (Denning, M.R.).
36. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 54-55.
37. Id at 57-59.
38. Id at 53.
39. Civil Aviation Act 1971, c. 75, § 4(3).
40. Civil Aviation Act 1971, c. 75, § 3(1).
41. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, FUTURE CIVIL AVIATION POLICY, CMD. No. 6400, (1975/
1976).
42. Throughout LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, the selection of "case" materials serves to illus-
trate the text. The examples are sometimes judicial cases but, given the nature of administrative law
[Vol. 1985:523
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Law and Administration illustrates the pervasive use of discretion by
agency personnel. Following the general description of the British
ombudsman, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration
(PCA),43 Chapter Eight discusses ombudsmen's investigations into com-
plaints about the handling of compensation following the Land Compen-
sation Act of 1973, 44 which permitted compensation for individuals
suffering personal upset and distress from forced housing moves.45 Like
much of modem administrative law in any country, this glimpse into the
real world of agency activities depicts much informal discretion that, of
course, is perceived as "law" by affected citizens. Judicial review is ab-
sent in this graphic display of ombudsman firewatching and agency dis-
cretionary reaction. Confronted with thousands of late claims for
personal upset and distress, the appropriate local ombudsman attempted
a variety of actions ranging from low profile meetings with administra-
tive personnel or compromise offers to drop a particularly embarrassing
investigation in return for agency compensation to a claimant to more
and the leaning of the authors to the Green Light position, see Harlow, Administrative Reaction to
Judicial Review, 1976 PuB. L. 116, 121 (1976) (agencies react to adverse cases by seeking and ob-
taining legislative change), often consist of dispute studies rather than court opinions. For example,
Chapter Six, "Firefighting to Firewatching: The Council on Tribunals," C. HARLow & R. RAWL-
INGS, supra note 1, at 165-98, contains no judicial decisions. Harlow and Rawlings provide a de-
tailed discussion of the history and experience of the Council's consultative and advisory function
over British tribunal procedure. Harlow and Rawlings provide the reader with numerous illustra-
tions of Council on Tribunal actions. Id. at 165-71. See generally Council on Tribunals, THE FUNc-
TIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON TRIBUNALS, CMND. No. 7805 at 3, 4, 20 & 21-22 (1980) (emphasizing
consultative and advisory function over procedure and recommending a more general advisory ca-
pacity covering administrative adjudication). See also R. WRAITH & P. HUTCHESON, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE TRIBUNALS 196-221 (1973) (discussing supervision and control by Parliament and the Council
on Tribunals); Yardley, The Functions of the Council on Tribunas 1980 J. Soc. WELFARE L. 265,
271 (concluding that the Council has made substantial accomplishments in the field of tribunals).
For comparison of the Council on Tribunals to its less influential American equivalent, the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, see B. ScHWARTz & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF Gov-
ERNMENT 174-84 (1972). Readers observe Council firewatching techniques such as questioning an
agency response that defeated the Council's jurisdiction and informally discussing the lack of reasons
for a particular agency decision with departmental personnel. Alternatively, we see examples of a
Council without much overall power acknowledging that "existing arrangements for handling com-
plaints are unsatisfactory," C. HARLOW & ;L RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 180, and ponder the sad
tale of the Council's 1965-1982 attempt to consolidate various Rent Tribunals through the lame
weapon of recommendations. The source of these illustrations is not judicial cases but the Council's
own annual report. See COUNCIL ON TRIBUNALS, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON TRIBU-
NALS, CMND. No. 7805 (1980).
43. C. HARLow & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 227.
44. Land Compensation Act of 1973, c. 26, § 29 (1).
45. For an account on the history of the ombudsman in the United Kingdom, see F. STACY,
THE BRrTISH OMBUDSMAN (1971). For discussion of the PCA's interaction with courts and other
bodies, see Bradley, The Role of the Ombudsman in Relation to the Protection of Citizens' Rights, 39
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 304 (1980).
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public responses such as written findings of maladministration. 46 Harlow
and Rawlings also provide the relevant departmental reactions to the
various ombudsmen efforts. These discretionary reactions vary consider-
ably, from the simple ignoring of the PCA plea for across-the-board noti-
fication, to the more complex written notification to the media
concerning the procedure for filing claims. In describing governmental
responses to repeated ombudsmen pleas for notice to potential claimants,
Harlow and Rawlings paint an unusually clear picture of governmental
bodies' use of discretion in everyday decisionmaking. 47
II. ORGANIZATION
Part I of this review concerned Harlow and Rawlings' weaving of
text and case studies into a different style of administrative law book; the
focus was on the distinctive methodology of Law and Administration.
The organization of Law and Administration is also unique. While the
first twelve chapters are novel in combining cases and text and integrat-
ing theory fully into legal principles, their contents are largely old stuff to
the readers of administrative law: rulemaking, agency adjudication, judi-
cial review, theories of administrative law, and legal institutions.48 How-
ever, it is the combination of these rather "normal" chapters with the
remaining seven chapters that gives Law and Administration a fresh
scheme of organization as well as methodology. Chapters thirteen
46. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLiNGS, supra note 1, at 239-40; see also Parliamentary Commis-
sioner Act 1967, c. 13, § 10(3) (test of maladministration basis of PCA special report to Parliament);
R. v. Local Comm'r for Ad. for the North & East area of England, ex parte Bradford Metropolitan
City Council, [1979] 2 All E.R. 893, 898 (Ct. App.) (Denning, M.R.) ("maladministration" triggers
jurisdiction of ombudsman to inquire and is an "open-ended [concept] concerning manner in which
a decision is reached or discretion is exercised; but excluding the merits of the decision itself or of the
discretion itself") (emphasis in original); J. BEATsoN & M. MATTHEWS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 642-43 (1983). An example of maladministration offered in LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION is the failure to inform an eligible tenant claimant of the possibility of filing a
claim for personal upset after a series of dealings between the eligible potential claimant and the
governmental body. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 234.
47. Throughout this fascinating saga, governmental bodies were caught in a difficult position.
The relevant legislation created both substantive liability to persons suffering distress and a deadline
for filing claims without any provision for notice to potential claimants. Land Compensation Act of
1973; see C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 228. Most ombudsmen efforts requested
the governmental bodies to provide the notice function for clear reasons of convenience. The ensu-
ing situation constitutes a fairly typical one for a governmental body faced with inadequate legisla-
tion: should it rectify the situation by the "rule" of costly across-the-board notice, continue to deny
claims filed late because of inadequate notice, or use discretion to decide claims on a selective en-
forcement case-by-case basis?
48. To be sure, the heavy dose of agency discretion added to these chapters is unusual in major
British or American books concerning administrative law. Cf. M. ADLER & A. BRADLEY, JUSTICE,
DISCRETION AND POVERTY 55-90 (1976) (discussing role of discretion in British benefit programs);
Bradley, Research and Reform in Administrative Law, 13 J. Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 35 (1974) (atypi-
cal focus on the nature of discretion as employed in administrative agencies).
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through nineteen provide a careful look at how administrative bodies op-
erate when engaging in the processes of compensation, planning, and dis-
cretionary decisionmaking in the areas of immigration and social welfare.
In a very real way, the contents of Law and Administration consider ad-
ministrative law as having legal and administrative content; the first
twelve largely procedural chapters detail the impact of law upon agen-
cies, and the last seven chapters describe significant processes character-
istic of governmental bodies. The style and tenor of the last seven
chapters are that of the law and society movement. American readers
will find the focus on the behavior of bureaucrats and processes of ad-
ministration not unlike the writing of Rabin.49
The two parts of the book mesh quite well. The legal foundation
provided by the first part of the book allows the reader more fully to
understand the subsequent examinations of particular activities of ad-
ministrative law. Most of modern traditional administrative law regu-
lates agency procedure. Knowledge of procedure is important for what it
provides-understanding of the procedures governing agency action-
and for what it omits-explanation of important agency policy goals and
the broad discretion inevitably present in the actions of government
authorities.
Decades of graduates of the standard administrative law course that
lacked coverage of non-procedural administrative law have worked on
unfamiliar administrative agency issues with little procedural content.
The drafting or challenge of Environmental Protection Agency regula-
tions concerning solid waste requires the implementation of particular
substantive policies and not the procedural niceties that preoccupy the
typical administrative law book. Knowledge of procedure is essential to
ensure the successful implementation of agency action, but the hurdles of
procedural safeguards are usually overcome readily. Lawyers familiar
only with procedure offer employers little help on everyday issues con-
ceming a specific agency.
This analytical distinction between substantive and procedural ad-
ministrative law has troubled American teachers of the subject. Writing
in 1959, Arthur S. Miller urged administrative law teachers to integrate
substantive policy into an essentially procedural course.50 In 1975 Gell-
horn and Robinson called for a reevaluation of the academic contents of
49. See, eg., P. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS Vii (1979)
(stressing administrative process and functions); cf C. HARLow & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at
xxiii ("[W]e do not intend to convey a monolithic vision of a 'state' serviced by faceless Weberian
bureaucrats.").
50. See Miller, Prolegomenon to a Modernized Study ofAdministrative Law, 12 J. LEGAL EDuc.
33, 34-35 (1959).
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administrative law.51 They criticized past administrative law courses for
focusing on procedure and neglecting the substantive policies of agencies
and called for the development of "at least some rudimentary under-
standing of what the agency does [and] of the substantive policy issues
involved."' 52 Two years later, Rabin wrote of the shift in administrative
law teaching from judicial review and procedure to examination of the
substantive law and policy underlying agency action.5 3 With the publica-
tion of Breyer and Stewart's Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy,54
American administrative law students and their teachers could use a
casebook that melded the substantive and procedural elements of admin-
istrative law.5 5 The Breyer and Stewart book merits critical acclaim;56 it
was the first American administrative law casebook to acknowledge or-
ganizationally the deficiency of other casebooks that cover only proce-
dural matters.
Adherents to the old-style administrative law books may proclaim
that "substantive" administrative law should be ignored because its con-
tent is too specific, expansive, varied, and constantly evolving. Nonethe-
less, the presence of significant unifying substantive policies implemented
by agencies merits coverage in administrative law teaching materials.
The anti-monopoly theory of economic regulation57 dominates numerous
agencies. Numerous other agencies are concerned with external cost reg-
ulation. Various benefactory agencies distribute monetary benefits to the
underprivileged. The existence of such similarities in policy justifies ef-
forts to include in modem administrative law books "substantive" ad-
ministrative law principles along with the relevant "legal" procedure.
Breyer and Stewart made a major contribution to administrative policy
study by beginning the complicated task of categorizing the work of ad-
51. See Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 30, at 771.
52. Id. at 786.
53. See R. RAmN, supra note 49, at 7-14; Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline
in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 120, 130, 137 (1977). For similar views
from a United Kingdom perspective see McAuslan, Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and
Judicial Policy, 46 MOD. L. REv. 1, 20 (1983).
54. S. BREYER & R. STEwART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (1979).
55. True, Gellhorn, Book Review, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1384, 1388-89 (1980), rightly points out
that the Breyer and Stewart work is not completely "substantive"; it deals with much of the contents
of its "procedural" competitors and employs an organization making substantive policy subservient
to traditional administrative procedure.
56. For generally positive reviews of ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY, see
Estreicher, Book Review, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 315 (1980); Gellhorn, supra note 55.
57. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 251-70 (2d ed. 1977) (public utili-
ties and common carriers are regulated to control profit, entry, and price structure); Posner, Theories
of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGM'T Sm. 335, 336, 350-56 (1974) (exploring and
suggesting modifications to the anti-monopoly and public interest theories of agency behavior).
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ministrative agencies.58
The organization and contents of Law and Administration should
satisfy proponents of the "substantive" administrative law style and, at
the same time, intrigue the more numerous administrative law teachers
wedded to a basic course emphasizing procedure. Unlike Breyer and
Stewart, Harlow and Rawlings do not distinguish between procedure and
substance. Yet they adopt an analytical scheme of organization as fresh
as that begun by Breyer and Stewart. By including careful examination
of the administrative process, Harlow and Rawlings reject the one-di-
mensional focus characteristic of the more doctrinaire works of
deSmith,59 Wade6° or Craig.61
Because chapters thirteen through nineteen emphasize the actual
process work of agency officials, Law and Administration necessarily de-
picts some aspects of substantive law. For example, Chapter Fourteen,
"Planning and Participation, ' 62 specifically covers planning as "an out-
put function of government comparable to rulemaking or rule-applica-
tion."' 63 The chapter also focuses on the control of development through
local plans and broader, more central control mechanisms of Cabinet or
Minister direction and deals extensively with the form and effect of citi-
zen participation in planning decisions. 64 The emphasis upon the process
of administration is, accordingly, presented in tandem with the exercise
of substantive planning law.
The concluding two chapters focus on welfare or "social assistance."
These chapters critically evaluate substantive policies 65 and, at the same
time, probe the use of agency discretion in administering relatively vague
legislation. Not surprisingly, Harlow and Rawlings uncover the presence
of discretion "seen by administrators to be inefficient," and opposed by
welfare attorneys. Yet they show that some amount of discretion may be
58. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY devises five modes of regulating busi-
nesses; natural monopoly regulation through cost of service ratemaking; allocating governmental
largesse through use of a "public interest" yardstick, standard setting; historical price regulation;
and licensing. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 54, at 18. Breyer subsequently refined and
explained more fully these regulatory tools in S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 36-155
(1982).
59. S. DESMrrH, JUDICIAL REvmw oF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (J. Evans 4th ed. 1980).
60. H. WADE, ADMImSrRATIVE LAW (5th ed. 1982).
61. P. CRAIG, ADmMSTRATrVE LAW (1983).
62. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLiNGS, supra note 1, at 419-56.
63. Id. at 419.
64. Id at 437-56.
65. LAW AND ADMINmTRATION describes British social assistance as "designed to provide
enough money to make ends meet without difficulty." C. HARLOW & R.RAWLINGS, supra note I, at
578 (quoting R. LISTER, SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT RIGHTs 17 (1974)).
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essential to provide a measure of "discretionary justice" 66 and avoid an
inflexible, overly legalistic system. As is true throughout Law and Ad-
ministration, these chapters seek to determine if enough structured dis-
cretion exists to permit a humane and flexible administrative scheme that
is able to maneuver through flexible rules yet is protected against excess
discretion.67 The integration of discretion into this and prior chapters
provides consistent reminders of the often discretionary fashion in which
administrators implement theory and forces the reader to assess the posi-
tive as well as the negative aspects of discretion.
III. CRITIQUE
It is extremely difficult to be critical of so fine a book as Law and
Administration. Already termed "the most stimulating, searching and
significant publication on administrative law for many years,"' 68 the book
represents a scholarly triumph of the first rank, particularly in the meth-
odology and scheme of organization. Law and Administration seems the
most thoughtful treatment of British administrative law published in
some time.
A few notes of cautionary doubt, however, are merited. First, it is
unclear exactly how administrative teachers and lawyers will use Law
and Administration. Academics could surely assign the book for an elec-
tive course or seminar in administrative law designed primarily for ad-
vanced students. Indeed, Law and Administration contains enough
general theory and traditional treatment of administrative law to be en-
tirely appropriate for use in a seminar in an American law school. Both
novice and more advanced students will surely profit from using Law and
Administration. Teachers desirous of using the book for a first course in
Administrative Law may want to think twice before assigning the book.
While it makes excellent use of cases to develop and exemplify text, it is
not a casebook attempting to make available to students the bread-and-
butter materials relating to the essential subtopics of administrative
law.69 At the same time, it is not a textbook that spells out administra-
66. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 588-89. See also Titmuss, Welfare 'Rights,'
Law and Discretion. 42 POL. Q. 113, 126-27 (1971).
67. LAW AND ADMINmTRATION explores "structuring discretion" at length. C. HARLOW &
R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 134-55. These pages probe the notion of using rulemaking to supply
administrators with helpful "guidelines" or "factors" to be systematically employed in the exercise
of discretion. The example of the Oregon Parole Board's guidelines illustrates "structured discre-
tion." Id at 135-42.
68. Hutchinson, Book Review, 134 NEW L.J. 770, 771 (1984).
69. British professors seeking such a book might do better to assign the recent Beatson and
Matthews casebook. See J. BEATsON & M. MATrHEWS, ADMmNSmTATiVE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1983).
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tive law rules in a coherent fashion. Doctrine, while present throughout
Law and Administration, is not its focus; this is a book of theories and
processes, not rules. These pragmatic cautions do not deprecate the
overall worth of the piece, and the book could be used as the primary
assigned reading by a professor willing to rework class lectures around it.
Second, like most books, this one has a few internal problems that,
while not at all detracting from the major influence the book should
have, frustrate the readers and merit nitpicking. In spots the authors cite
authority without offering citation.70 Some of the few footnotes relegated
to the end of the book seem digressive and not directly supportive of
text.71 Also, a number of seemingly critical points of policy are articu-
lated and then, surprisingly, handled too briefly in an underdeveloped
fashion. For example, following their rich and detailed elaboration of the
Red and Green Light theories, Harlow and Rawlings present the views
of those writers associated with an intermediate non-polarized position
seeking a balanced role for courts and administration. 72 The few pages
devoted to this fertile area of research are fascinating reading, but frus-
trating for one seeking the complete theoretical formulation clearly
sought by the authors. Similarly, the short subsection "Retreat from
Rules?" concluding the chapter on rulemaking and discretion explores
the limits of rules because "people regulate their behaviour by reference
to group ethos and the approval of their fellows rather than by 'the
law.' -73 Harlow and Rawlings whet readers' appetites for a detailed in-
vestigation of this meaty subject by quoting from sociologist Albert Reiss
and explaining how agency personnel can sometimes play games as well
with rules as with discretion.74 Three pages of such treatment, however,
hardly scratch the surface of possible sociological solutions to the di-
lemma of achieving an optimal balance of uniform fairness of rules and
the individualized treatment from discretion.
70. See C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 56, 101.
71. See, eg., id at 649 (note 10 to "Chapter 2: Green Light theories"). The text reference to
note 10 refers to the consensus between Green and Red Light theorists about the need for a more
"sophisticated system of administrative law." Id at 47. Note 10, rather than supporting the text or
providing examples of this consensus, takes the readers on an interesting detour to authorities writ-
ing "on the history of concern for the individual inside the Labour Party." Id at 649; see also id at
101 (textual statement that in ouster cases certiorari is only available for jurisdictional error followed
by no authority).
72. Id at 47-51. Harlow and Rawlings include this scholarship in the middle ground: L.
SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW-THE NEW DIMENSION (1974); D. YARDLEY, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINIS-
TRATvE LAW (1981); Bradley, Book Review, I LEGAL STuD. 329 (1981); Winkler, Law, State and
Economy: The Industry Act 1975 in Context, 2 BRrr. J. LAW & Soc'y, 103 (1975).
73. C. HARLOw & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 162.
74. Id. at 162-64 (quoting Reiss, Book Review, 68 MICH. L. REv. 789, 794-95 (1970) (review-
ing K. DAVIS, DISCRETmONARY JUSTICE (1969)).
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Third, for a book that consistently offers readers up-to-date cases
and jurisprudence, Law and Administration surprisingly omits considera-
tion of one of the most important recent developments in administrative
theory-privatisation or deregulation. The fact that governments in
Britain and the United States have implemented deregulation schemes
with fervor 75 strangely receives little attention from Harlow and Rawl-
ings. There exists a rich and varied literature on deregulation theory.
76
Breyer's influential book Regulation and Its Reform77 sets out a compre-
hensive analytic scheme yielding an appropriate regulatory (or deregu-
latory) mechanism for various public problems.
Detailed treatment of privatisation or deregulation would have en-
hanced the critical theoretical foundation of Law and Administration's
opening chapters. The process of privatisation or deregulation is primar-
fly legislative and policy-based in nature, not judicial. Given its positivist
nature, including privatisation could have enhanced the Green Light the-
ory. Furthermore, introduction of a detailed section on privatisation
would have reinforced the treatment of discretion that Harlow and
Rawlings include in most chapters of Law and Administration. To the
extent that an industry is deregulated it may be that some portion of
agency discretion is eliminated. Yet, if an agency is delegated the task of
deciding the appropriate type of deregulatory response, it may be as-
signed a significant measure of discretion. The question currently con-
fronting policymakers and ministers focuses on the converse issue: what
75. See, eg., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
throughout 49 U.S.C. (1982)); Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified
throughout Titles 11, 45 & 49 U.S.C. (1982)); British Aerospace Act 1980, c. 26 (privatizing aircraft
manufacturer); Telecommunications Act 1984, c. 12 (privatizing formerly-nationalized telecommu.
nications conglomerate); Competition is the spur, The Sunday Times (London), July 1, 1984, at 16,
col. 1 (editorial summarizing Thatcher administration policy of privatisation, or selling to public
shares of formerly nationalized industries, and outlining forthcoming challenges); ABA COMMIS-
SION ON LAW & THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 25 (1979) (urging
reliance on competitive market rather than regulation where possible). Recent British privatisation
efforts have varied from the completed sales of formerly nationalized British Aerospace, British
ports, Britoil, Enterprise Oil, British Petroleum, and National Freight to the planned sales of British
Telecom and British Airways.
76. See eg., K. HAYWARD, GOVERNMENT AND BRITISH AEROSPACE: A CASE STUDY IN
POSTWAR TECHNOLOGY POLICY (1983); J. LEGRAND & P. ROBINSON, PRIVATISATION AND THE
WELFARE STATE (1984); R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAus, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION (1983);
R. NOLL & B. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION: INTEREST GROUPS IN THE
REGULATORY PROCESS (1983); A. OGUS & C. VELJONOVSKI, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
LAW AND REGULATION 233-51 (1984); W. ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC
OWNERSHIP (2d ed. 1962); Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Al-
ternatives and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REV. 547 (1979); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT Sci. 335 (1974); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law:
A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256 (1981).
77. S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
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is the appropriate amount of discretion to be exercised when achieving
and implementing deregulation or privatisation? 78 True, Harlow and
Rawlings do provide readers a tidbit on the nature of economic regula-
tion by briefly discussing and quoting from the "corporate state" writings
of Winder and Reich.79 This, however, is far from the detailed treat-
ment on privatisation the book could have used. Failure to cover this
important set of fashionable issues marks a missed opportunity.
Lastly, it is possible that some readers will fault Harlow and Rawl-
ings' treatment of positivism. The unrelenting nature of their criticism 80
makes the authors appear to be particularly skeptical of positive law and
perhaps equally skeptical of existing normative doctrine relating to ad-
ministrative law. Throughout Law and Administration Harlow and
Rawlings express cynicism regarding the efficacy of specific rules of judi-
cial review, cast doubt on procedural reform as a means to improve ad-
ministrative law, and criticize those supporting contrary normative
theories. They are quick to condemn a narrow version of positivism that
unrealistically separates positive law from any political or social
context.81
Nonetheless, it would be inaccurate to consider Law and Adminis-
tration a nihilist work critical of all existing positivist doctrine and nor-
mative scholarship in administrative law. Harlow and Rawlings display
hope that law can aid the ongoing process of administration by providing
a means to help administrators in the effective implementation of their
varied tasks. This simple normative thought relates to the Green Light
position thoughtfully set out at the beginning of Law and Administration
and convincingly reiterated throughout the book. While the authors
never expressly call for wholesale adoption of the Green Light theory,
they seem optimistic that some accommodation between legal principles
and an appropriate amount of administrative and judicial discretion can
advance the present state of administrative law. They clearly advocate
"structuring discretion"8 2 and appreciate that "rules are introduced to
78. Cf Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (agency
seeking to rescind rule must rationally explain reasons for change); Diver, Policymaking Paradigms
in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REV. 393 (1981) (elaborating two models of policymaking).
79. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 50-51 (quoting Winkler, Law, State and
Economy: The Industry Act 1975 in Context, 2 BrT. J. L. & Soc'Y 103, 117-18 (1975) and C.
REICH, supra note 28, at 117-18).
80. Hutchinson's generally positive review of LAW AND ADMINISTRATION faulted its "lack of
any obvious constructive perspective" and termed it "largely a critical and comprehensive assault on
administrative law and scholarship." Hutchinson, supra note 68, at 771.
81. See C. HARLOW & R. RAwLINGs, supra note 1, at 4-6 (citing and quoting from P. NONET
& D. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TowARD RESPONSIVE LAW 57 (1978)).
82. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 1, at 134-44 (citing K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE (1971)); R. DwoRmN, TAuNG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977).
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eliminate arbitrariness,"8 3 yet understand that some administrative dis-
cretion is essential "in order to cater for the needs of the individual"84
and provide a workable system of administration. 5 Rules will not regu-
larly resolve the toughest decisions faced by administrators in the
trenches of administrative law. Conversely, rules aid the fair, equitable,
and similar solutions of more numerous easy decisions.
Harlow and Rawlings consistently provide a scholarly jurispruden-
tial foundation for the law-discretion dilemma so central to understand-
ing and improving administrative law. They contrast Dworkin's notion
of "weak discretion"8 6 with Jowell's conception of discretion that varies
from "strong" to weak. 7 In addition to clarifying judicial review of ad-
ministrative action, these jurisprudential discussions help the reader ap-
preciate the broad scope inherent in adoption of a system relying on
administrative discretion.
Harlow and Rawlings' introduction of a heavy dose of jurisprudence
in a major study of administrative law is a significant accomplishment.
Administrative law represents a burgeoning body of positive law through
the continually increasing promulgation of administrative rules. At the
same time, administrative law includes elastic notions of judicial review"8
and huge amounts of bureaucratic discretion. The ingredients of this
body of law are ideal for further jurisprudential attention.
IV. CONCLUSION
Articulation of a few criticisms fails to detract from the overall
luster of Law and Administration. The publisher lauds its own Law in
Context series, of which Law and Administration is the latest addition,
and boldly refers to the series as "a new departure in scholarly legal writ-
ing" originating in "a desire to broaden the study of law, using material
from other social sciences, from business studies and from any other dis-
cipline that helps to explain the operation in practice of the subject under
discussion."8' 9 I confess to picking up Law and Administration with a
83. C. HARLow & R. RAWLJNGS, supra note 1, at 145.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 130-34.
86. Id. at 132 (citing R. DwoRKiN, supra note 82, at 31-32).
87. Id at 133 (citing Jowell, The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion, 1973 PuB. LAW
178, 179-80).
88. Harlow and Rawlings discuss ambiguous rulings dfjudicial review in Chapter 11, entitled
"Discretionary Justice?" C. HARLow & R. RAWLiNGS, supra note 1, at 310-47 (citing Gellhorn &
Robinson, supra note 30, at 780 ("rules governing judicial review have no more substance at the core
than a seedless grape").
89. LAW AND ADMnmiSTRATION, rear cover (emphasis in original). Another admirable book
in this series that mixes cases and text, although not to the degree of LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, is
P. McAusLAN, LAND, LAW AND PLANNING (1975).
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healthy skepticism after chancing on this promotional polemic. Few
books could deliver on this brash sales pitch. Law and Administration
satisfies its publisher's assertions with panache.

